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Key terms and acronyms 
Active income. Income earned from direct investments. Generally the taxing right rests with the 
source country if there is a permanent establishment.
African Tax 
Administration Forum 
(ATAF).
International organisation for collaboration between African tax administrations.
Capital gains tax. Tax levied on the sale of an asset, a percentage of the increase in value of the asset 
since it was purchased or created by the seller. As opposed to a property transfer 
tax, which is a (smaller) percentage of the total price paid.
Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA).
International organisation incorporating 19 African countries from Egypt in the 
North to Zimbabwe in the South.
East African 
Community (EAC).
International organisation incorporating Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda.
Foreign tax credit. Reduction in a taxpayer’s liability in their home country corresponding to the 
amount of tax that has been paid abroad.
Indirect transfer. Sale of an asset located in one country that takes place through the sale of a 
holding company resident in another country, often to avoid Capital Gains Tax in the 
first country.
Management fees/
technical service fees.
Many developing countries impose a withholding tax on these payments. The term 
is usually a short hand for all fees of a technical, consultancy or managerial nature.
Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
(OECD).
International organisation whose members are 34 wealthier democracies, and 
which describes itself as the “market leader” in international tax standard-setting
Passive income. Income earned from sources such as portfolio investment and royalties. Generally, 
the taxing right rests with the residence country, although treaties grant a limited 
right to the source country.
Permanent 
establishment.
Concept in tax law that defines a minimum threshold of economic activity 
above which a foreign company starts to incur source taxation of active income. 
Traditionally, this has been based on having a physical presence for a minimum 
length of time.
Residence taxation. Tax levied by a government on a taxpayer on the basis that they reside in a country. 
Especially, in this context, tax on an outward investor’s income from abroad.
Source taxation. Tax levied by a government on a taxpayer on the basis that they earned income 
within a country. Especially, in this context, tax on income earned within a country 
by a foreign investor.
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Southern African 
Development 
Community (SADC).
International organisation incorporating 15 African states covering the whole of 
Southern Africa, as far North as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania.
Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement 
(TIEA).
Bilateral agreement creating legal authority and obligation to exchange taxpayer 
information between the tax administrations of two countries.
Tax sparing credit. Special provision in a tax treaty that extends the foreign tax credit in one country 
to include taxes that would have been paid to the other country had they not been 
reduced or exempted under a tax incentive.
Tax treaty. Sometimes referred to as double taxation treaties (DTTs) or double taxation 
agreements (DTAs), these are predominantly bilateral agreements between states 
that establish a common framework for taxation of cross-border activity. They 
are generally titled “Agreements for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital.”
Territorial taxation. Taxation of a country’s residents limited only to their income earned at home, that 
is, exempting income earned abroad. This is now the dominant system among 
OECD countries for active income.
United Nations Tax 
Committee.
Formally known as the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters, this is a group of 25 people nominated by UN member states to develop 
international tax standards and to “give special attention to developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition.” Its most important output is the UN 
model tax treaty.
Withholding tax (WHT). Tax levied on the recipient of a payment, but collected from the payer. Typically 
countries may levy WHT on dividends, interest payments, royalties and technical 
service fees.
Worldwide taxation. Taxation of a country’s residents on all their income earned at home and abroad, 
usually (but not always) with a foreign tax credit.
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1  Introduction
There is growing attention on the question of tax treaties signed by developing countries. The costs of 
tax treaties to developing countries have been highlighted in recent years by NGOs such as ActionAid and 
SOMO.1 During 2014, an influential IMF paper warned that developing countries “would be well-advised 
to sign treaties only with considerable caution,”2 and the OECD, as part of its Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) project, proposes to add text to the commentary of its model treaty to help countries decide 
“whether a treaty should be concluded with a State but also…whether a State should seek to modify or 
replace an existing treaty or even, as a last resort, terminate a treaty.”3
Meanwhile, some developing countries seem recently 
to have become concerned by the negative impacts 
of some of their treaties. Rwanda and South Africa 
have successfully renegotiated their agreements with 
Mauritius. Argentina and Mongolia have cancelled 
or renegotiated several agreements. Responding 
to this pressure, two of the developed countries 
whose treaty networks have raised concerns, the 
Netherlands and Ireland, have begun a process of 
review.4
To investigate this apparent shift in opinion among 
policymakers, and to see what lessons can be drawn 
by other developing countries, Tax Justice Network 
Africa (TJN-A) commissioned this study of current 
policy towards tax treaties in Uganda and Zambia, 
two countries that appear to be questioning past 
decisions. Fieldwork, which consisted of interviews 
with government officials and private sector tax 
advisers, took place in Kampala and Lusaka in 
September 2014. Uganda has announced a review 
of its policy towards tax treaties, 5 while Zambia is 
renegotiating several of its treaties. The Ugandan 
review has several motivations, according to finance 
ministry officials. The lack of a politically enforced 
policy to underpin negotiations is one concern. “When 
I go to negotiate, all I have is my own judgement,” 
according to a negotiator. “We thought that cabinet 
should express itself.”6 Officials are also concerned 
about the taxation of technical services provided 
by professionals in the oil industry, and are asking 
questions about the relatively poor deal Uganda got in 
its as yet unratified agreement with China.
Zambia, it seems, is keen to update very old treaties 
that were negotiated on poor terms by over-zealous 
officials in the 1970s. But a recent treaty signed with 
China on poor terms has created a difficult precedent, 
dragging down the terms of its recent negotiation 
with the UK.7 Zambia is also encumbered with several 
colonial-era treaties that need urgent attention.
This report is divided into four following sections. 
Section two (2) describes the historical development 
1 Mike Lewis, Sweet Nothings: The Human Cost of a British Sugar Giant Avoiding Taxes in Southern Africa (London: ActionAid UK, 2013); 
Katrin McGauran, “Should the Netherlands Sign Tax Treaties with Developing Countries?,” SOMO, 2013, http:/somo.nl/publications-en/
Publication_3958/at_download/fullfile.
2 IMF, Spillovers on International Corporate Taxation (Washington, DC, 2014).
3 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 
(OECD Publishing, 2014), doi:10.1787/9789264219120-en.
4 Netherlands Ministry of Finance, Government’s Response to the Report from SEO Economics Amsterdam on Other Financial Institutions 
and the IBFD Report on Developing Countries, vol. 2012, 2013; Irish Ministry of Finance, Public Consultation: Spillover Analysis - Possible 
Effects of the Irish Tax System on Developing Economies (Dublin, 2014).
5 Ismail Musa Ladu, “Govt Suspends Double Taxation Pacts,” Daily Monitor, June 06, 2014.
6 Interviews for this project were conducted in Kampala and Lusaka in September 2014. Across the two countries, the author spoke 
with ten current and former government officials, eight private sector tax advisers, and a number of other stakeholders. Comments are 
attributed in such a way as to avoid identifying interviewees who requested anonymity.
7 The newly renegotiated treaty with the UK is discussed in Martin Hearson, “Time We Scrutinised China’s Tax Treaty Practice, Too,” Tax, 
Development and International Relations, 2014, http:/martinhearson.wordpress.com/2014/07/02/time-we-scrutinised-chinas-tax-
treaty-practice-too/.
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of sub-Saharan Africa’s tax treaty network, including 
some of the reasons given for its development. 
Uganda and Zambia are used as examples. Section 
three (3) looks at some of the core vulnerabilities in 
the content of tax treaties signed by African countries, 
set in the context of weaknesses in their domestic 
laws. Section four (4) provides a critical perspective on 
recent initiatives taken by individual countries, regional 
organisations and other international organisations.
Section five (5) provides recommendations for African 
countries. In summary, they should:
1) Review all their existing tax treaties and 
domestic legislation, to identify areas where 
they are most vulnerable to revenue loss. 
This should include permanent establishment 
definitions, protection from treaty shopping, and 
withholding and capital gains taxes.
2) Formulate ambitious national models by 
applying a “best available” approach to existing 
models (EAC, COMESA, and UN), current 
treaties, and domestic legislation, none of which 
are currently adequate. 
3) Identify red lines for negotiations from within 
these models.
4) Based on investment and remittance data, 
request renegotiations of treaties that have 
the greatest actual (or potential in terms of 
capital gains) cost. These renegotiations should 
be conducted on the basis of an improved 
distribution of taxing rights, not a “balanced” 
negotiation.
5) Cancel these high-impact treaties if the red lines 
cannot be obtained.
6) Incorporate an assessment of tax foregone due 
to tax treaties into an annual breakdown of tax 
expenditures.
7) Ensure that all tax treaties are subject to 
parliamentary approval as part of the ratification 
process.
8) Ensure that future updates to provisions of 
the UN and OECD model treaties, or to their 
commentaries and reservations/observations, 
reflect the positions set out in their national 
models.
9) Strengthen the African model treaties (EAC, 
COMESA, SADC) so that they act as opposite 
poles to the OECD model, rather than 
compromises between the UN and OECD 
models.
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2 The development of sub-Saharan Africa tax 
treaty networks
African countries’ patchwork tax treaty networks today are the product of 50 years of changing power 
relations, policy fashions and tax measures. Analysing the processes that led to the treaties in force today 
reveals that in many cases they do not fulfil the original role that may have been envisioned by developing 
countries who signed them. This section outlines the growth of sub-Saharan countries’ treaty networks and 
analyses some of the main drivers, based on research in Zambia, Uganda and the UK.
There are almost 300 tax treaties in force in sub-
Saharan Africa countries. About half of them are with 
Western European countries, chiefly with former 
colonial powers and Nordic countries. The number 
of treaties with Western Europe has been growing 
steadily, and continues to grow at the same pace. The 
1990s showed a sharp increase in the rate at which 
African countries signed treaties, as they began to 
sign with countries in other parts of the world, not 
least other African countries: South Africa, Mauritius 
and Tunisia all emerged as significant treaty partners 
for sub-Saharan countries during the last two 
decades.
All South African countries, excludes renegotiations
Figure 1: tax treaties signed by sub-Saharan countries
2.1 Africa’s growing tax treaty network
Summary: Sub Saharan countries continue to sign treaties with traditional investor countries at a steady 
rate, but they have more recently begun to conclude treaties with emerging economies and other developing 
countries. This includes a growing number with low-tax countries that are risks for treaty shopping.
9Tax Justice Network – Africa
Figure 2: Countries having signed five our more treaties with sub-Saharan African countries
Year signed
2012
1952
Source: International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, analysed by the author8
8 Because they have a specific role in terms of tax treaties, these figures exclude South Africa and Mauritius from the list of sub-Saharan 
African countries
This historical pattern needs to be taken into account 
when comparing treaties. About 100 treaties, most 
of them with countries of Western Europe that are 
sources of foreign direct investment and aid, are 
more than 20 years old. Half of these were signed 
before the United Nations model tax treaty was 
first published in 1980. Ideas about the content of 
tax treaties, patterns of investment, tax rates and 
systems, forms of tax planning, and political priorities 
on the continent have all changed considerably since 
these treaties were concluded. 
These older treaties may present very different 
challenges when compared with those – around 
100 – signed since 2000. This latter group includes 
a large number with South Africa and Mauritius, the 
main hubs through which investment enters the 
region. It also includes treaties with newer sources 
of investment that are not OECD members, such as 
India and China. These treaties may be more up-to-
date in areas such as provisions for administrative 
cooperation between tax authorities, and can be 
regarded as treaties between developing countries. 
But they are also treaties between countries with 
asymmetric investment flows, which means the 
underlying policy concerns do not differ greatly from 
treaties signed with European countries. Officials 
interviewed for this research were under no doubt 
about the pressure to make concessions from these 
countries. “[Our treaty with] India had the WHT on 
management fees in it, then ten, 15 years down the 
line they want it out,” said one, while “China you know 
is a powerhouse. They come and say ‘for us to further 
this investment, we need a treaty.’ That’s what it’s 
about: bluffing.”
2.2 Uganda and Zambia as case studies
Summary: Zambia is an example of a country with a lot of treaties dating from the 1970s, while Uganda’s 
treaties are more recent, mostly concluded in the late 1990s and 2000s. Zambia has decided to renegotiate 
some of the treaties that are most at risk of abuse, while Uganda has announced a freeze in new treaties 
while it formulates a clear policy.
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Uganda and Zambia have contrasting patterns of 
treaty signature. Zambia went to great lengths to 
negotiate treaties in the 1970s, and most of its 
treaty network today consists of agreements signed 
around 40 years ago. For 25 years, no new treaties 
were concluded, although officials indicated that 
negotiations have been taking place throughout, 
or at least since 2000. The first new treaties were 
actually signed from 2010, with China, Botswana, the 
Seychelles and Mauritius.
Zambia has begun to renegotiate some of its older 
treaties, including with the UK, Netherlands, India and 
Ireland (the latter a particularly bad deal for Zambia). 
Even if these renegotiations produce good outcomes, 
some problematic treaties will remain. Its agreements 
with Switzerland and France are extensions of treaties 
signed by the UK in the 1950s, during the colonial 
era. The Swiss treaty prevents Zambia from imposing 
any tax on interest, royalty and management fee 
payments to Swiss residents.
More recent Zambian treaties with Mauritius and the 
Seychelles – countries commonly used for treaty 
shopping – do not contain anti-abuse provisions, 
and the treaty with China sets low withholding taxes 
that are likely to drag down Zambia’s taxing rights 
in any (re)negotiations, as they have already done 
with the UK. According to an official, the Mauritius 
and Seychelles treaties were negotiated many years 
before they were signed. “The process of approval 
took too long such that by the time the agreements 
were signed, the agreements were ‘out of tune’ and 
therefore lacked the standards we now insist upon.” 
Uganda, in contrast, did not sign any tax treaties (apart 
from with Zambia) until 1992. From 1997 until 2007 
it signed a handful, mostly with European countries, 
and a treaty with China (on terms similar to Zambia’s) 
is agreed but not yet ratified. While Uganda’s treaties 
retain greater rights for it to tax foreign investors than 
Zambia’s do, there are still weak spots, in particular 
the treaties with the Netherlands and Mauritius. The 
former has much lower source taxing rights than 
Uganda’s other treaties, and neither contains an anti-
treaty shopping provision.
Uganda’s treaties tend to have more provisions 
that protect its taxing rights than do those of 
Zambia, although the latter’s more recent treaties 
are an improvement. This may be because many of 
Zambia’s earlier treaties were negotiated before the 
UN model tax treaty was published. The UN model 
sets out wording that is more suited to developing 
countries than the other major model, that of the 
OECD. Important differences between the UN and 
OECD models include the definition of permanent 
establishment, which defines when a company’s 
activity in (say) Uganda becomes significant enough 
to incur tax on its profits. In addition, Uganda seems 
to have been keen from the start to retain the right 
to levy a withholding tax on technical service fees, 
something that neither the UN nor OECD model 
currently provides for. In both countries, there has 
been a trend towards lower withholding tax rates in 
the most recent treaties.
Figure 3: tax treaties signed by Uganda and Zambia
Uganda
11
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Zambia 
2.3 Some past explanations for tax treaty negotiation
Summary: Tax treaties reflect the political, legal and economic environments of the time at which they were 
concluded. This includes colonial relations, the fashion for ‘tax sparing credits’, and the era before recent 
developments in tax information exchange. All countries now need to re-examine their treaties in the light of 
current political, economic and legal realities.
The original argument in favour of tax treaties, as 
indicated by their formal name, was the elimination 
of double taxation on cross border investors. That 
is, reconciling the competing claims to tax the 
same income of the home and host country so 
that taxpayers do not pay tax twice on income that 
crosses the border. This argument has been criticised 
in theoretical academic papers,9 and the counter-
argument is articulated in new text proposed for 
the commentary to the OECD model tax treaty: “A 
large number of cases of…double taxation can be 
eliminated through domestic provisions…without the 
need for tax treaties.”10
This point can be tested by looking at the specifics 
of given treaty partners. It is hard to see evidence of 
potential double taxation on a scale that might really 
be holding back investment into African countries, 
because all Uganda and Zambia’s treaty partners do 
indeed have domestic provisions to prevent double 
taxation on their outward investors.11 It is, therefore, 
not surprising that double taxation was rarely cited as 
a problem by officials or tax advisers in Uganda and 
Zambia, and when it was, few tangible examples were 
available.
While some of Zambia and Uganda’s historical tax 
treaties may have been the product of political 
alliance-building, most are consistent with the policy 
towards investment promotion that was present in 
these countries at the time of signing. The rest of this 
section discusses several key eras in tax treaty policy.
Colonial legacy
When African countries became independent, 
they could choose whether or not to inherit the 
agreements put in place by their colonial parents. 
Some, such as Uganda and Tanzania, preferred to 
let the colonial legacy lapse without replacing it, 
apparently prioritising tax revenue over investor-
friendliness. Others, such as Kenya and Nigeria, kept 
their old agreements in place until they were ready to 
renegotiate in the 1970s, perhaps fearing a negative 
effect on investment if they cancelled. In some others, 
such as Zambia and (until very recently) Malawi, a 
few colonial-era agreements stayed in force where 
renegotiations were not completed. 
In Zambia’s case, its agreements with France and 
Switzerland are actually ancient United Kingdom 
treaties, based on negotiations by the UK in 1950 and 
1954, and extended to its colonies. These treaties 
have long been superseded in the UK by new treaties, 
but as the updates were signed after Zambia’s 
independence, the old agreements remain in force as 
9 A commonly cited example is Tsilly Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32 
(2000): 939.
10 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances.
11 An exception is Kenya, which has a treaty with Zambia. But there is little Kenyan outward investment into Zambia.
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far as Zambia is concerned. When the UK and France 
recently terminated a past treaty and replaced it 
with a new one, the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) 
questioned whether it should continue to honour the 
1950 agreement, but according to Zambian officials, 
the French position was that the treaty remained in 
force.
The Zambia-Switzerland treaty is perhaps of more 
concern, given the considerable volume of trade 
between the countries, the use of Switzerland in tax 
avoidance and evasion schemes, and the presence 
of Swiss investors, especially Glencore. The treaty 
prevents Zambia from levying any withholding tax on 
interest, royalty and management fee payments to 
Switzerland, and it has an out-of-date exchange of 
information provision that is likely to be ineffective. 
Zambia has tried to renegotiate it in the past, officials 
said, but requests have been rebuffed and the treaty 
is now slated for termination.
Tax sparing and tax competition
Many African countries were very busy negotiating 
tax treaties during the 1970s, predominantly with 
European countries. As observed above, sometimes 
these were renegotiations of treaties currently in force 
or recently cancelled, while at other times they put 
in place arrangements where none had existed since 
independence. 
One major objective of these treaty negotiations was 
to secure ‘tax sparing’ credits.  These were provisions 
that gave investors resident in one country a credit 
against their home country tax bill not only for 
taxes they had paid abroad, but also for taxes that 
they would have paid, had they not been ‘spared’ 
through tax incentives. The objective was to ensure 
that the benefits of tax incentives accrued to the 
investor, rather than being cancelled out by higher tax 
obligations at home. 
From 1970 to 1984, Zambia concluded 11 treaties 
with OECD member countries, and one with India. Of 
these, ten provided for tax sparing credits, while the 
other two exempted dividends paid to direct investors 
from tax in the home country entirely, which had the 
same effect. Negotiations with the UK in 1971 were 
instigated by Zambia, with the tax sparing motivation 
noted upfront in the formal request for negotiations: 
“Zambia would, in particular, wish to discuss matters 
arising from the operation of the Zambian Pioneer 
Industries (Relief from Income Tax) Act.”12
Apart from its 1968 agreement with Zambia, Uganda 
did not sign any treaties until 1992. Soon after 
signing its first treaty, with the UK, Uganda’s Minister 
for Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
announced that the government would “embark 
on negotiating double taxation agreements with 
identified major trading partners.”13 As the Minister 
explained, the purpose of the treaties was to “ensure 
that the effectiveness of current incentives is not 
eroded by the absence of complementary tax credits” 
because “in the absence of any complementary tax 
holidays with the home countries of foreign investors, 
the revenue foregone by reducing a company’s tax 
liability in Uganda represents a revenue gain by the 
Ministry of Finance in the home country” with no 
benefit to the company concerned.14 Its treaties with 
the UK, South Africa, Mauritius and Italy also include 
tax sparing provisions.15
There are a number of reasons to question the value 
of tax sparing provisions. In 1998, the OECD published 
“Tax Sparing: a Reconsideration”, which highlighted 
the potential negative impacts of tax sparing 
arrangements in tax treaties, in particular that they 
could potentially be abused, and that they created 
an incentive to repatriate profits quickly, rather than 
reinvest them in a country.16 This OECD report on its 
own did not halt the spread of tax sparing provisions, 
12 Document with the author on file
13 Mr. J. Mayanja Nkangi, quoted in Hansard, 25.6.93
14 ibid
15 Historical notes of negotiations between the UK and developing countries indicate that one priority for many developing countries at 
this time was to expand their taxing rights in areas that older colonial era treaties restricted (for example, withholding taxes on royalties, 
and taxes on foreign shipping). Some negotiations, for example Uganda and Tanzania’s talks with the UK, failed because agreement 
on these matters could not be reached. Zambia, too, was willing to sacrifice the UK’s offer of tax sparing credits to retain a ten percent 
withholding tax rate on royalties, only for the UK to later agree a protocol to the treaty that allowed it both.
16 OECD, Tax Sparing : A Reconsideration., ed. OECD (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998).
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although it did suggest some ‘best practice’ in the 
area.
Furthermore, there is a growing empirical evidence 
base questioning the effectiveness of tax incentives, 
in particular fixed term tax holidays of the kind that 
many tax sparing clauses in tax treaties refer to 
specifically. Incentives may attract foreign investment, 
but it is often transitory and crowds out domestic 
investment.17
Tax sparing clauses are usually framed as a 
concession by the latter in a context of competition 
for inward investment by developing countries. British 
civil service correspondence during the peak era of 
tax sparing clauses, the 1970s, reveals that there 
was actually a vociferous lobby by British businesses 
for tax treaties with sparing clauses, or even for 
unilateral tax sparing by the UK, to strengthen their 
position against competitors from other countries for 
outward investment opportunities.18 In this reading, 
by concluding a tax treaty with the UK, a developing 
country would have been helping British firms to 
outcompete their rivals, not necessarily bringing in 
investment that would not otherwise have come.
Perhaps a more important development than the 
growing consensus of skepticism towards tax 
incentives and tax sparing clauses has been the 
spread of ‘territorial’ tax systems. As more and more 
countries have exempted foreign-source dividends 
from tax altogether (sometimes limited to those from 
direct investors), tax sparing provisions in treaties 
have become redundant. All but one of the OECD 
countries with which Zambia has concluded a tax 
treaty now employs a ‘territorial’ tax system that 
exempts foreign-source dividends. 
Table 1:  Zambia’s treaties with OECD member 
states
Country Year signed with 
Zambia1
Year territorial 
tax system 
introduced2
Japan 1970 2009
Ireland 1971 -
Norway 1971 2004
Italy 1972 1990
United 
Kingdom
1972 2009
Denmark 1973 1992
Germany 1973 2001
Sweden 1974 2003
Netherlands 1977 1914
Finland 1978 1920
Canada 1984 1951
Poland 1995 2004
Treaties in bold have tax sparing provisions
Treaties as tax incentives
In the context of territorial tax systems, tax treaties 
played a different role. Increasingly, they were not 
tools to increase the effectiveness of tax incentives: 
they were tax incentives. If a multinational firm retains 
the benefits of, say, lower withholding tax rates, 
this lowers the overall tax cost of investing in one 
country, relative to another. This is the core logic of tax 
competition.
However, because treaty benefits only accrue to 
multinationals based in the treaty partner country, 
they distort the pattern of inward investment in 
favour of firms from the treaty partner. In this sense, 
tax treaties are also a form of tax competition by 
capital exporting countries: by lowering the tax costs 
of their firms, they give those firms a competitive 
edge in the developing country market.
17 For a discussion see pages 21-22 of Alexander Klemm, Causes, benefits, and risks of business tax incentives, IMF Working Paper 
WP/09?21 (Washington D.C. January 2009). 
18 Documents with the author on file.
19 IBFD, “IBFD Tax Research Platform,” 2014, http:/online.ibfd.org/.
20 PWC, Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in the OECD, 2013.
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Just as the consensus among international tax 
advisers seems to be that most tax incentives are 
ineffective,21 there was a startling consensus across 
the local stakeholders interviewed for this paper 
that tax treaties were not a primary consideration 
for investors in deciding whether or not to invest 
in Uganda and Zambia. A Zambian finance ministry 
official stated that “the argument that…treaties can 
be used to attract investment into Zambia is always a 
difficult premise to advance.” His Ugandan counterpart 
concurred that “nobody comes to invest because 
you have a tax treaty. When you see the rationale to 
attract investment, it sounds laudable. But when you 
look at the evidence, it’s not the case.” 
According to an accountant in a tax advisory firm, “it is 
a secondary factor you take into account in terms of 
structuring.” A tax lawyer agreed:
21 For example, four international organisations argued that, “where governance is poor, [incentives] may do little to attract investment – 
and when they do attract foreign direct investment (FDI), this may well be at the expense of domestic investment or FDI into some other 
country. Tax-driven investment may also prove transitory.” (IMF et al., Supporting the Development of More Effective Tax Systems: A 
Report to the G-20 Development Working Group by the IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, 2011, 19. And in a survey of African tax officials, 
participants “underscored that tax incentives and exemptions have been over-emphasized as investment promotion tools” and “have 
not necessarily 
22 See, for example, the list of “Reasons for investing in Uganda” at http:/ www.ugandainvest.go.ug/index.php/
investment-guide 
23 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Investor Survey Report 2012 (Kampala, 2012).
It would seem to me that tax is a secondary consideration. From our experience we 
have seen investors are looking to the economic drivers: business-based, rather than 
tax-based. A business will say ‘now we have decided where we are going to work, let’s 
get a tax expert to structure it’.
Promotional literature from Uganda and Zambia’s 
investment authorities do not mention their 
networks of tax treaties.22 An official at the Uganda 
Investment Authority (UIA) told us that investors are 
not interested in tax treaties: “to most of them it is 
not an important thing.” Indeed, tax treaties are not 
mentioned anywhere in a comprehensive survey of 
investors conducted by the UIA and Uganda’s National 
Bureau of Statistics.23
Despite this apparent consensus, there is also no 
doubt that, as with other tax incentives, individual 
investors lobby for tax treaties. A tax adviser said 
that potential investors do often ask about them. 
According to an official in the COMESA secretariat, 
“the initiative for negotiating a DTA comes from 
the multinationals. It’s the large companies that 
are behind it. They are operating behind their 
government.” A finance ministry official agreed: “if 
you look at all these [treaties] that have been signed, 
you can probably link it to a very major company that 
came into this country.”
While it is hard to pin down specific examples, a 
number of stakeholders interviewed suggested 
that airlines are particularly keen to see tax treaties 
negotiated, to prevent incurring tax liabilities 
everywhere that they have a ground operation or sell 
tickets. This may explain the growing treaty networks 
of Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Kenya, 
for example. “The only reason they were doing that 
[asking for a treaty] was because of the airline,” said 
one negotiator referring to a treaty with a country 
with a major airline. It is important to realise, however, 
that standalone air and/or shipping tax treaties can be 
concluded without the need for a full agreement.
Officials in both countries indicated that they have no 
country-specific evidence base on the effects of tax 
treaties. There is, however, a significant volume of 
academic study on the effect of tax treaties on foreign 
direct investment, using increasingly sophisticated 
methods and data. Consistent with the views 
expressed above, many of these studies have failed 
to find a result for developing countries. The best we 
can say on the basis of current evidence is that tax 
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treaties have a short-run effect encouraging investors 
to establish new companies in developing countries, 
but they do not affect the size of investments in the 
long run.24 Importantly, however, even these studies 
struggle to distinguish between genuine increases 
in overall investment into a developing country, 
distortive competition effects that change the 
composition but not the total volume of investment 
into a country, and apparent changes in investment 
flows that are the result of tax planning structures. 
In any event, any evaluation of the likely or actual 
effect of a tax treaty should start with a solid 
grounding in the tax systems of the two countries. 
This should indicate whether a treaty will solve real 
double taxation problems, whether it will create treaty 
shopping opportunities, whether its main role will 
be as a tax incentive, and if that is the case, whether 
this is consistent with national policy towards tax 
incentives.
Responding robustly to requests from other countries 
really does require a political steer, for negotiators 
to be able to stick to evidence-based decisions and 
accept the potential consequences. One former official 
explained the dilemma. “I know there’s empirical 
evidence that it [a treaty] has no effect on investment, 
but the reality country-to-country is that there’s a 
bluff that goes on, and countries don’t want to take 
the risk of losing big investments.”
24 “Do Tax Treaties Affect Foreign Investment? The Plot Thickens,” accessed October 20, 2014, http:/martinhearson.wordpress.
com/2014/06/19/do-tax-treaties-affect-foreign-investment-the-plot-thickens/. See also IMF, Spillovers on International Corporate 
Taxation (Washington, DC, 2014).
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3 Key concerns in the content of tax treaties 
Not all tax treaties are the same. This section runs through a selection of the provisions of tax treaties 
that raise the most concerns. It is not intended to be exhaustive. After a discussion of how the legal and 
economic context makes particular provisions more or less significant, it then discusses treaty rules that set 
limits on withholding taxes, the permanent establishment definition that sets out when a country is entitled 
to tax a foreign investor, rules around capital gains tax, and finally anti-abuse rules that can be built into tax 
treaties.
3.1 Tax treaties in context
Summary: Understanding the gains and losses from a particular treaty begins by placing it in the legal and 
economic context of each treaty partner. This includes their tax laws and the investment flows between them, 
the ways in which these might change in the foreseeable future, and the precedent any unusual feature of a 
treaty creates for future negotiations.
A tax treaty cannot be read in isolation from the 
tax laws of the countries that sign it, the trade and 
investment flows that it affects, or indeed the treaties 
signed by competitor countries. A focus on individual 
countries, as in this report, makes it possible to 
incorporate all these factors into the analysis.
One reason why it is important to consider national 
tax laws is that, while a tax treaty may prevent a 
developing country from levying certain taxes, in 
most cases it cannot create a liability where one 
does not exist. Sometimes, therefore, it might seem 
irrelevant whether or not a particular article from an 
international model has been included in a treaty, 
because it creates a source taxing right that the 
developing country does not take up. This may be the 
case, for example, where countries do not levy capital 
gains taxes.
Conversely, a treaty may prevent a developing (source) 
country from taxing some income that the treaty 
partner (the residence country) chooses not to tax 
itself. If the treaty partner takes up its residence taxing 
right, the effect is to redistribute tax revenue to it 
from the developing country. But if it does not, the 
effect may instead be to create double non-taxation. 
This latter situation can be exploited in tax planning 
schemes. Capital gains tax provisions in developing 
countries’ tax treaties with Mauritius (which does not 
levy capital gains tax on international companies) are 
a good example of this scenario.
In other cases, an article may pertain to a type of 
economic activity that hardly exists between two 
countries (or indeed, a treaty may be signed between 
two countries with negligible trade and investment 
prospects). An example may be the article covering 
shipping and airlines where a country is landlocked or 
there are no direct flights between them. 
In these situations, treaties need to be considered 
holistically. This means taking into account three kinds 
of impact:
- Actual economic impact. The treaty’s effect 
on fiscal revenue and on investor behaviour. 
As noted earlier, there is only weak evidence in 
general terms that treaties signed by developing 
countries increase economic activity, but 
anticipating any effect will surely depend on the 
interaction of a treaty with specific elements of 
the two countries’ tax systems. 
- Precedent. When Denmark agreed to include 
a clause on technical fees in its 1973 treaty 
with Kenya, this probably had only a small 
effect on tax revenue in Kenya. But Kenya was 
able to point to the Danish concession in its 
negotiations with the UK, its main trade and 
investment partner, eventually persuading it to 
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include a similar – and probably more valuable 
- provision.25 Conversely, Zambia’s 2012 treaty 
with China included lower withholding tax rates 
than any of Zambia’s previous treaties. The 
cost of this concession was more significant 
than just tax revenue from Chinese investors: 
the rates in that treaty became a benchmark in 
subsequent renegotiations with the UK as well, 
because, as a British High Commission official 
observed, “it’s hard enough to compete against 
Chinese businesses in Africa as it is.”
- Fiscal policy space. In most countries, tax 
treaties take precedence over domestic 
law. Tax systems evolve with political and 
economic changes, but treaties do not, unless 
they are renegotiated. So negotiators should 
consider their tax system and economy not 
only as it exists, but also as it might change 
in the foreseeable future. To implement 
some withholding taxes in the 1970s, African 
countries such as Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria 
had to cancel treaties they inherited at 
independence that placed limits on their taxing 
rights. Zambia recently raised some withholding 
tax rates, but will not see any increased revenue 
from payments to treaty countries, because 
treaty rates are capped well below the new 
domestic rates. 
25 This can be seen in minutes of the UK-Kenya negotiations, available from the UK national archives
3.2 Withholding taxes
Summary: Over time, treaties signed by African countries have capped the rates of withholding taxes (WHTs) 
that they can apply at lower and lower rates. Although this partly reflects a fall in statutory WHT rates in 
some countries, Zambia is an example of a country where the revenue that can be raised by from recent 
increases in statutory WHTs will be limited by the limits imposed in its treaties.
Withholding taxes (WHTs) are taxes levied by a country 
on certain types of payments made to overseas 
companies. Most African countries levy some 
withholding taxes on dividends, interest, royalties and 
technical service fees. Technically, WHTs are levied on 
the company overseas that receives the payment, 
but they are ‘withheld’ by the local company sending 
it. Tax treaties set maximum thresholds on the level 
of WHTs that a country can levy on these payments, 
and in some cases – especially technical service 
fees – they prevent them from levying these taxes 
altogether.
Withholding taxes have several functions. First, 
they allow a developing country to tax income that 
a foreign company receives from residents of the 
developing country. This means that the developing 
country is gaining a share of the profits generated 
from, for example, lending money to its residents, or 
exploiting intellectual property in its markets.
Revenue-raising is not the only role played by 
withholding taxes, a point that is often forgotten 
when they are discussed. A second role is as anti-
avoidance measures. WHTs discourage multinational 
companies from shifting profits out of the country 
through these payments, or at least they ensure that 
the developing country gains some tax revenue when 
they do. “We realised that a lot of money was flying 
out through management fees,” a Ugandan official 
said, explaining why this was a priority for his country.
Thirdly, withholding taxes also influence companies’ 
behaviour. A withholding tax on dividends may 
encourage foreign investors to reinvest the profits 
they make in a developing country, rather than 
repatriating them or moving them offshore. A tax on 
technical service fees paid overseas may encourage 
them to look for – or help create – expertise within 
the country, rather than offshoring it. 
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Figure 4: Average with-holding rates in treaties signed by sub-Saharan countries, by decade
Maximum withholding tax rates on all forms of 
income in African countries’ tax treaties have declined 
over time, by at least five percentage points from the 
1980s to the 1990s (Figure 4). The decline could be 
considered as benign, since it corresponds to a fall 
in statutory rates in many countries: compare, for 
example, Uganda’s current 15 percent rates to the 
40 percent it charged on some forms of income in 
the 1970s. But it is of more concern when countries 
do try to increase withholding taxes as Zambia has 
recently done, increasing taxes on royalties and 
management fees from 15 to 20 percent.
Table 2: Withholding tax rates in 2014
Uganda Zambia
FDI dividends 15% 15%
Portfolio dividends 15% 15%
Interest 15% 15%
Royalties 15% 20%
Technical service fees 15% 20%
In Zambia’s case, royalty WHT rates in treaties have been declining, to as low as five (5) percent in some recent 
treaties, in contrast to a domestic rate which is now 20 percent. 
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Figure 5: Declining WHT rate on royalties in Zambia’s tax treaties
In Uganda’s case, the FDI dividend rate has fallen over time, to well below the 15 percent in current domestic law.
Figure 6: Declining WHT rate on FDI dividends in Uganda’s tax treaties
Uganda has usually insisted on a clause permitting a 
WHT on management fees (although it seems to be 
becoming less successful at this) while this doesn’t 
seem to have been a priority for Zambia. Yet in current 
domestic legislation, the WHT rate on management 
fees in Zambia is higher than it is in Uganda.  
According to one Zambian official, “in the past [our 
priority] was just royalties, but now we’ve realised we 
are losing on management fees too.”
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Figure 7: WHT rate on management fees in Uganda and Zambia’s tax treaties
Table 3: Estimated annual revenue foregone due to reduced withholding taxes on remitted FDI earnings
UGANDA Estimated cross-border 
payment (US$m)
WHT discount in treaty (%) WHT foregone (US$m)
Dividends Interest Dividends Interest Dividends Interest
Netherlands 106.7 5.7 0%* 5% 16.0 0.3
Mauritius 10.9 2.5 10% 10% 0.6 0.1
India 2.8 0.2 10% 10% 0.1 0.0
South Africa 1.8 1.3 10% 10% 0.1 0.1
Norway 0.8 0.0 10% 10% 0.04 0.0
ZAMBIA Estimated cross-border 
payment (US$m)
WHT discount in treaty (%) WHT foregone (US$m)
Dividends Interest Dividends Interest Dividends Interest
United Kingdom 112 66 10%ˆ 5% 11.2 3.3
China 51 53 10% 5% 5.1 2.7
Netherlands 42 32 10% 5% 4.2 1.6
Switzerland 23 32 15% 15% 3.5 4.8
Mauritius 12 12 10% 5% 1.2 0.6
Ireland 14 1 15% 15% 2.1 0.1
France 7 2 15% 15% 1.1 0.3
Source: Investment stocks reported by Uganda and Zambia to the 2012 IMF coordinated direct investment survey, prima-
ry return on FDI in 2012 from World Bank’s World Development Indicators26
*Treaty rate is most likely 0%, but for some companies it may be 15% (for companies not composed of shares).
Tˆhe new treaty rates have been used for illustrative purposes, although this treaty was not in effect in 2012, the 
year to which the data refer.
26 Assumes that the primary return on FDI (totals: Uganda $252m, Zambia $1.03bn) is at a constant rate across all investments
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It is difficult to estimate the total revenue foregone 
through these withholding tax reductions because 
the data on most cross-border flows are not publicly 
available. But publicly available data do allow us 
to estimate a portion of the revenue foregone, 
specifically the cost of reduced WHTs on dividends 
and interest payments to direct investors. Table 3 
gives estimates of the withholding tax foregone in 
this way, for the most costly treaties signed by each 
country. 
As can be seen, the vast majority of revenue 
foregone by Uganda on these types of payment 
is through a single treaty, with the Netherlands. 
In contrast, Zambia foregoes significant revenue 
through a number of different treaties. These figures 
do not include the revenue given up through treaty 
reductions in capital gains tax, portfolio dividends and 
loans, royalties and management fees, or restrictions 
on levying corporate income tax. They do, however, 
illustrate how estimates of revenue foregone can 
help to identify priorities for treaty reviews as well as 
informing public debate.
3.3 Permanent establishment
Summary: Countries’ domestic laws define the threshold at which a multinational business becomes liable 
to tax on the profits it makes there. Tax treaties usually restrict this definition more than domestic law, but in 
other cases the model treaties suggest areas in which domestic law could operate with a lower threshold.
The ‘permanent establishment’ (PE) provisions in 
countries’ domestic laws and in tax treaties set out 
the conditions in which a foreign investor operating 
through a branch (rather than an incorporated 
subsidiary) in a developing country is liable to tax. If 
the company doesn’t meet these criteria, then the 
developing country can’t tax it. This makes managing 
‘PE risk’ an important part of tax planning for 
multinational companies. “Withholding tax rates are 
nothing,” according to a finance ministry official. “You 
can have high rates and then you’ve given out a lot in 
PEs.”
There are a lot of possible variations within the model 
treaties’ PE definitions, but here we briefly review 
three important areas for developing countries at 
present. The first is the threshold for how many days 
a construction site must exist before it constitutes a 
PE. In all Uganda’s treaties, the answer is six months 
(twice as much as domestic law, which says 90 
days), while Zambia’s vary between three and twelve 
months (domestic law says 183 days). Both countries 
may have given away too much in an environment 
where, as one government official remarked, “the 
Chinese can do things in three months.”
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Figure 8: UN model permanent establishment provisions in Uganda and Zambia’s treaties in force
Article Description Uganda (of 10 
treaties in force)
Zambia (of 18 
treaties in force*)
5(3)(a) Length of time for a construction site
Less than 6 months (better) 0% 6%
6 months 100% 56%
More than 6 months (worse) 0% 39%
5(3)(a) Supervisory activities included? 80% 94%
5(3)(b) Service permanent establishment 30% 28%
5(4)(a) Delivery not excluded 60% 6%
5(4)(b) Delivery not excluded 70% 6%
5(5)(b) Stock warehouse included 30% 33%
5(6) Insurance company included 20% 17%
The second issue concerns supervisory activities 
connected to a construction site. Here both countries 
have done well at maintaining the right to tax, with 
only a few exceptions, such as the Uganda-UK treaty.
The third issue is the provision of services where there 
is a ‘fixed base’, i.e. a consistent physical presence. 
Zambia’s domestic law definition explicitly permits it 
to tax these profits if the presence lasts six months, 
but Uganda’s does not. The large number of Zambian 
treaties that don’t include a service PE provision is  
therefore more concerning than those of Uganda, 
where the position is less clear.
In these and other areas of PE definition, Uganda has 
generally done better than Zambia at retaining its 
taxing rights, but these gains may be frustrated by 
its domestic law definition, which is strong in terms 
of the short number of days it applies, but narrow in 
the list of activities, especially the lack of an explicit 
mention of the ‘service PE’. Conversely, Zambia has 
a strong domestic definition that mostly follows the 
UN model convention, but this is often restricted by 
concessions in its tax treaties.
3.4 Capital gains
Summary: Capital gains tax could be an important source of revenue for many developing countries. But tax 
treaties frequently create possibilities for avoidance by multinational investors. Countries that don’t currently 
have capital gains tax should not ignore these provisions of tax treaties, in case they decide to introduce a 
capital gains tax at a future date.
Capital gains tax is levied when a company or 
individual sells an asset for a higher value than it 
receives it. It can be complicated to administer, 
especially in countries where inflation rates are 
high, which may explain why some developing 
countries do not currently have this tax.27 Because 
foreign investors own a large proportion of Africa’s 
large companies, especially those with large assets 
such as mines, tax treaties can have a big impact 
27 Instead, they may have a property transfer tax, which is charged at a lower rate on the whole value of the sale.
*Two non-standard treaties excluded
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on their ability to implement or introduce a capital 
gains tax. Kenya, for example, announced plans to 
introduce a capital gains tax, at the same time as it 
concluded a tax treaty with Mauritius opening up new 
opportunities to avoid it.
Uganda and Zambia are in very different positions, 
because Uganda already has a capital gains tax, while 
Zambia does not. Uganda’s capital gains tax applies 
to gains from the sale of moveable and immovable 
property (the latter might include a mine, a factory, or 
a mobile phone mast). To prevent tax avoidance using 
shell companies, it also applies to sales of shares 
in ‘property rich’ companies whose value comes 
principally from such immoveable property.
Unfortunately, most of Uganda’s tax treaties frustrate 
this desire, because, while they allow it to tax gains 
from the sale of property by foreign investors, they 
don’t include the ‘property rich’ companies provision, 
even though it is in Uganda’s domestic law and in the 
UN and OECD models. This allows foreign companies 
with large amounts of assets in Uganda to avoid a 
capital gains liability by structuring a sale through an 
indirect transfer of shares in a treaty partner country.
Neither Uganda nor Zambia has ever signed a tax 
treaty that permits it to tax gains from the sale of 
shares in ordinary companies, even though this is a 
provision in the UN model convention. At present, 
neither levies such a tax, just as Zambia does not tax 
capital gains at all. If they were to change this policy, 
they would find their tax treaties a significant obstacle.
28 Lewis, Sweet Nothings: The Human Cost of a British Sugar Giant Avoiding Taxes in Southern Africa.
3.5 Treaty shopping/anti-avoidance
Summary: Tax treaties, especially those with low-tax jurisdictions such as the Netherlands and Mauritius, 
create significant risks for tax avoidance. Domestic rules may not be enough to prevent this, but developing 
countries’ tax treaties rarely contain specific or general anti-abuse rules.
The use of tax treaties for Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) has a growing profile, not least 
in Zambia following a report by ActionAid that 
highlighted the use of the country’s treaties with 
Ireland and the Netherlands.28 The concern here is 
companies’ exploitation of tax rules (for example on 
permanent establishment) to prevent profits made in 
a developing country from being taxable there, or to 
shift those profits from the developing country to an 
offshore location. A full armoury of defences against 
these practices requires both specific rules to target 
particular known practices and general rules that 
widen the net. To be most effective, rules in domestic 
law and in tax treaties need to be designed to work 
together.
Uganda, for example, has a general ‘limitation of 
benefits’ rule in its income tax law, which specifically 
denies tax treaty benefits to companies whose 
underlying owners are not mostly residents of the 
treaty partner. The URA has only recently begun 
to use this rule to deny treaty benefits, and so far 
taxpayers have accepted its view, said URA officials. 
But the prevailing view in both the private sector 
and the URA is that this provision might not stand 
up to a legal challenge, because international treaty 
law generally prevents domestic law from overriding 
treaty commitments.
Zambia has a general anti-avoidance rule in its tax 
law, but this has never been used by the ZRA to deny 
treaty benefits to a taxpayer, government officials 
said. The same lack of certainty about the legal status 
of a ‘treaty override’ may underpin the ZRA’s reticence.
In any event, both countries’ treaties overwhelmingly 
lack anti-abuse provisions. General anti-abuse 
provisions in tax treaties are not currently common, 
although it is likely that they will become more 
so thanks to current work ongoing at the OECD. 
However, successive updates to the model tax 
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conventions have already introduced specific provisions that prevent the abuse of certain aspects of the treaties. 
These provisions appear in hardly any of the treaties signed by Uganda and Zambia.
Table 4: Examples of specific anti-abuse rules from the UN model in Uganda and Zambia’s tax treaties in force
Article Description Uganda (of 10 treaties in 
force)
Zambia (of 18 treaties in 
force*)
5(5)(b) Dependent agent 
maintaining stock
30% 33%
7(1)(b&c) Limited force of attraction 0% 17%
13(4) Capital gains – ‘property rich’ 10% 21%ˆ
*Two non-standard treaties excluded
ˆTreaties with no capital gains article excluded
This is not an abstract point. Uganda would be in 
a much certain position in its $85m dispute with 
Zain had it secured article 13(4) of the UN and 
OECD models in its treaty with the Netherlands;29 
anti-abuse rules in the Zambia-Ireland treaty may 
have prevented the ‘Dublin dog’s leg’ highlighted 
by ActionAid in the case of Zambia sugar. As a 
Zambian official said, “[treaties with] Ireland and the 
Netherlands have really messed us up” because of 
treaty shopping.
29 Court of Appeal of Uganda, Commissioner General, URA versus Zain International BV (2012).
30 Interview with KRA official, Nairobi, September 2013
3.6 Administrative cooperation
Summary: Officials in both countries indicate that one reason for negotiating new tax treaties and 
renegotiating old ones is to obtain administrative cooperation between tax authorities. This is undoubtedly 
important for tackling offshore tax evasion and for auditing multinational companies. But comprehensive tax 
treaties may not be the best way to achieve it.
Cooperation between tax authorities on international 
tax matters often requires some kind of treaty. 
Modern bilateral tax treaties bring with them the 
authority to cooperate in two important ways: 
information exchange and assistance in the collection 
of taxes. Other forms of mutual assistance, are 
generally obtained through multilateral conventions. 
Officials in both countries regard information 
exchange as an important benefit from tax treaties. 
But it is important to be discriminating about which 
treaties provide real benefits in this regard. Revenue 
officials said that Uganda makes at the most 
“maybe one request per year” using the existing tax 
information powers in its tax treaties. In Zambia, 
officials indicated that they do make use of these 
powers, but not all tax treaties are with countries 
from which they really need information. For another 
African country, Kenya, the most important partners 
for information exchange are low tax jurisdictions that 
contain subsidiaries of multinationals that conduct 
transfer pricing transactions with sister companies in 
Kenya. It has been pursuing tax information exchange 
agreements, rather than tax treaties, with these 
countries.30
A second area of administrative cooperation, cited 
frequently by officials, is the legal basis created by 
modern tax treaties for the tax authority of one 
country to collect taxes on behalf of the other. This is 
very important in cases where a taxpayer no longer 
has any assets in the developing country at the time 
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that an assessment is raised by the tax authority 
– large capital gains cases, for example, or cases of 
short duration permanent establishments. As Table 
2 shows, however, Uganda and Zambia’s treaty 
networks are somewhat patchy in their provision of 
this benefit.
31 ATAF Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance
32 The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance, formerly the OECD/Council of Europe Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Assistance
Table 5: Fiscal cooperation provisions in Uganda and Zambia’s tax treaties in force
Uganda (of 10 treaties in force) Zambia (of 18 treaties in force*)
Information exchange 100% 100%
Collection of taxes 40% 0%
*Two non-standard treaties excluded.
As noted earlier, Kenya is seeking information 
exchange through standalone TIEAs, rather than 
through tax agreements. Both information exchange 
and assistance in the collection of taxes are also 
available to African countries through multilateral 
agreements, which also provide for other forms 
of mutual assistance, such as joint auditing of 
multinational firms across several countries at once. 
Zambia and Uganda are both signatories to the ATAF 
multilateral convention, which has the advantage 
of including Mauritius, but is not yet in force.31 They 
could also follow Ghana in joining the multilateral 
convention initiated by the OECD and Council of 
Europe, which is in force and covers the vast majority 
of their tax treaty partners.32
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4 Examples of recent initiatives
4.1 Cancellations and renegotiations: what was achieved and why?
Summary: There are a number of examples of developing countries that have cancelled or sought to 
renegotiate particular tax treaties. Cancellations may improve the prospects for renegotiation, or they 
may follow from a failure to renegotiate. In any event, the results of renegotiations have been mixed for 
developing countries.
33 The notes of termination with the UK are on file with the author
Cancelling tax treaties is far from unprecedented. 
It has usually come about because countries want 
improved terms: either as part of a renegotiation 
strategy, or because renegotiations failed. As Table 6 
illustrates, cancellations in recent years have tended 
to relate to concerns about treaty shopping. But in the 
1970s, Kenya and Nigeria – for example – terminated 
the tax treaties they had inherited from colonial times, 
as part of a strategy to negotiate better terms.33
The decision to cancel a tax treaty should not be 
taken lightly. While in broad terms there does not 
seem to be a compelling benefit from most tax 
treaties, to balance out their costs in terms of tax 
revenue, countries should still consider any particular 
characteristics of their tax systems and those of their 
treaty partners that might make a specific treaty 
valuable. They should also consider whether the 
revenue benefits of cancelling a treaty are significant 
enough to justify the reputational cost of such a 
dramatic move.
Table 6: Some recent tax treaty cancellations
Terminating 
country
Partner country Year 
terminated
Reason given
Germany Brazil 2005 Non-standard transfer pricing rules in Brazil; new 
Brazilian taxes not included; no need for matching 
credits.
Indonesia Mauritius 2006 “There was an abuse that was inflicting a loss upon 
Indonesia”
Argentina Austria 2008 Suggested to be due to treaty shopping
Rwanda Mauritius 2012 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy
Mongolia Luxembourg 2012 Treaty shopping by mining companies; slow response 
to request to renegotiate
Mongolia Netherlands 2012 Treaty shopping by mining companies; refusal to meet 
renegotiation terms
Argentina Chile 2012
Argentina Spain 2012 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy
Argentina Switzerland 2012 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy
Malawi Netherlands 2013 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy
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Most renegotiations do not begin or end with a 
unilateral treaty cancellation; instead a new treaty 
supersedes the old one, or a protocol amending 
the previous treaty is agreed. A number of recent 
renegotiations provide better and worse examples 
from which developing countries can draw lessons.
Rwanda-Mauritius (2013). This renegotiation 
produced a significant improvement in terms for 
Rwanda. With withholding taxes set at zero, it was 
perhaps the case that “the only way was up”! But 
Rwanda’s new terms were among the best that any 
sub Saharan country had obtained in a treaty with 
Mauritius, with higher withholding taxes and low 
permanent establishment thresholds.
Table 7: High-risk provisions in sub-Saharan countries’ treaties with Mauritius, signed after 2000
Country Rwanda Senegal Uganda Zambia Kenya Rwanda
Year 2001 2002 2003 2011 2012 2013
Construction PE (months, lower 
is better)
12 9 6 9 12 6
Supervisory activities included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Services PE (months, lower is 
better)
12 9 4 No 6 6
Max dividend WHT Exempt Exempt 10 5 5 10
Max interest WHT Exempt Exempt 10 10 10 10
Max royalties WHT Exempt Exempt 10 5 10 10
Max management fees WHT Exempt Exempt 10 Exempt Exempt 12
Capital gains: property rich 
companies provision
No No No NA No No
Capital gains on sales of 
ordinary shares
No No No NA No No
Zambia-UK (2014). This renegotiation appears 
to have been the product of mutual desires to see 
changes. The result is a “balanced” negotiation that if 
anything leaves Zambia with fewer taxing rights, not 
more. As British and Zambian officials both confirmed, 
a key concern for the UK was to match the favourable 
withholding taxes given to Chinese investors in the 
2012 Zambia-China agreement. In return, Zambia 
obtained a services permanent establishment 
provision, and it will benefit from information 
exchange and assistance in the collection of taxes 
provisions. 
Zambia-Netherlands/Ireland (ongoing). Zambian 
officials indicated that the country’s renegotiations 
with the Netherlands and Ireland have produced 
significant improvements over the previous treaties, 
the result perhaps of political pressure on these two 
countries from civil society campaigns and the OECD 
BEPS project. These treaties can’t be evaluated, as 
they aren’t yet public. 
Argentina-Spain/Switzerland (2013/4). Following 
its treaty cancellations in 2012, Argentina negotiated 
replacement treaties with Spain and Switzerland. 
These new treaties included significant improvements 
for Argentina. Both were changed to allow Argentina 
to levy its personal assets tax on residents of 
the other country. The Swiss treaty introduced a 
modern exchange of information clause. The new 
Spanish treaty removed a most favoured nation 
clause, and was accompanied by a memorandum 
of understanding that included several anti-abuse 
provisions.
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South Africa-Mauritius (2013). Perhaps the best 
example of a renegotiation that took place without a 
prior cancellation, South Africa achieved major gains 
from its recent renegotiation with Mauritius. This 
included the right to tax capital gains from the sale of 
South African assets by Mauritian-owned ‘property-
rich’ companies, and to impose withholding taxes 
on royalties and interest, as well as a higher tax on 
dividends. The treaty also makes it harder for South 
African-managed companies to qualify as tax resident 
in Mauritius.
It is worth noting that many more tax treaty 
renegotiations have taken place than are visible in 
new treaties. In Zambia, in particular, renegotiated 
treaties have in the past become jammed in the 
process of cabinet approval. “You send it to the 
minister for permission, and it just sits there,” said one 
official. Zambia’s outdated treaty with South Africa is 
a concern for businesses, as one adviser explained. 
“The treaty with South Africa is very old, it can’t 
be implemented in places. It is 15 years since they 
renegotiated that treaty. Each side blames the other 
[that it has not yet been ratified].” Zambian officials 
indicated that this treaty has now received cabinet 
approval and is just awaiting signature.
4.2 Developments in African organisations
Summary: The EAC, COMESA and SADC have all formulated model treaties for negotiations with each other or 
with third countries. Although each model has one or two more ambitious provisions than the UN model, they 
are all on average less source-based than the UN model. An ambitious opening position for an African country 
should therefore pick the best available provisions from existing treaties, African models and the UN model.
Tax treaty negotiations take as their starting point 
model conventions. Historically, the two most 
influential model tax conventions have been those 
of the OECD and the United Nations, although many 
countries have their own national models, and some 
regional economic organisations have also formulated 
models. This proliferation is perhaps a little confusing 
for countries that might potentially use more than one 
model treaty. The model treaties each have strengths 
and weaknesses, which means that an African 
country seeking a good outcome could adopt a “best 
available” approach in selecting provisions to use for 
its own national model.
Capital exporting countries are most likely to start 
negotiations from the OECD model, and will expect 
African countries to make compromises from their 
own opening positions. To obtain a result with strong 
protection for their taxing rights, it therefore makes 
sense for African opening positions to be formulated 
on a more ambitious basis than the compromise 
outcome they are willing to accept. The UN model 
tax treaty is such a compromise position between 
developed and developing countries, which means 
that African regional models and countries’ national 
models should look to set out a stronger position, 
with the UN model as a reserve position.
The EAC model
As well as a multilateral tax treaty amongst its five 
members, the East African Community (EAC) has 
formulated a model tax treaty for negotiations with 
third countries. The EAC model has some strengths 
when compared to the UN model.  For example, it 
includes a general ‘limitation of benefits’ clause, which 
tries to prevent the application of the treaty where 
the company concerned has been using it for treaty 
shopping. This is similar to, but clearer than, the rule 
found in Uganda’s domestic legislation. 
Another strength of the EAC model is the inclusion 
of an article permitting a ten percent withholding tax 
on management fees. This article is quite common in 
treaties signed by some African countries, but for the 
time being it is missing from both the UN and OECD 
models.
The EAC model is weaker, however, when it comes 
to the quantitative thresholds specified throughout. 
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Here, it seems to give a compromise position rather 
than marking out a more ambitious position with 
the expectation that it will be knocked down in 
negotiations. It specifies withholding tax rates of 
7.5 percent on FDI shares (although with a high 
threshold of 50 percent ownership), which is lower 
than the rate in most treaties currently in force in 
EAC countries. Withholding tax rates on interest 
and royalty payments are capped at 15 percent, but 
this is reduced to ten percent for related parties, a 
concession that would surely be better made during 
the horse trading of negotiations.  The ten percent on 
management fees is well below the rate many EAC 
countries have in their domestic legislation.
The EAC model draws tighter restrictions on the 
circumstances in which African countries can tax 
inward investment as ‘permanent establishment’ 
than the UN model. For example, it follows the OECD 
model in excluding delivery locations. It proposes that 
construction projects and service providers should 
not be taxed unless they are present in a country for 
six months (no figure is specified in the UN model). In 
Uganda, officials seemed aware that many projects 
covered under these provisions may not be taxed, 
because they can be accomplished in less. “The 
Chinese can do things in three months,” a Finance 
Ministry official pointed out.
As for capital gains, the EAC model omits the UN 
paragraph 13(5) permitting source country taxation of 
on capital gains from the sale of general shares. It also 
uses the weaker OECD definition of a ‘property rich’ 
company in paragraph 13(4), which can be avoided 
through the use of a partnership or trust, rather than 
the stronger definition in the UN model. 
Finally, the EAC model takes the unusual step of 
including a most favoured nation (MFN) clause in its 
withholding tax articles. This is the clause in article 14:
If after the signature of this Agreement under any Convention or Agreement between 
a Contracting State and a third State, the Contracting State should limit its taxation 
at source on management or professional fees to a rate lower or a scope more 
restricted than the rate or scope provided for in this Agreement on the said items of 
income, then as from the date on which the relevant Contracting State Convention or 
Agreement enters into force the same rate or scope as provided for in that Convention 
or Agreement on the said items of income shall also apply under this Convention. 
An MFN clause can strengthen a country’s position 
in subsequent negotiations, because both sides 
appreciate the costs of it agreeing to a lower rate. 
But once triggered, those costs can be significant. A 
significant issue with respect to this clause is that it 
is bilateral: in a treaty with a capital exporting country, 
it seems that the clause could be triggered by the 
capital exporter concluding a subsequent agreement 
with lower withholding tax, even though any benefits 
from the resulting lower rate would overwhelmingly 
accrue to the capital exporter.
Such an incident occurred with respect to the 
April 2003 Venezuela-Spain treaty. In May 2006, 
the bilateral MFN clause in its interest article was 
triggered through a kind of domino effect: Estonia 
and Netherlands signed a treaty granting exclusive 
residence taxation rights over interest; this activated 
the MFN clause in the September 2003 Spain-Estonia 
treaty, which in turn activated the MFN clause in the 
Venezuela-Spain treaty. As a result, “Venezuela’s 
treaty with Spain has undoubtedly become the most 
favourable tax treaty executed by Venezuela to 
date”.39
An MFN clause, just like a six month PE definition, a 
7.5 or ten percent withholding tax, and numerous UN 
provisions that have not been carried across into the 
39 Leopold Escobar, “MFN Clause Activated in Spain-Venezuela Tax Treaty,” Tax Notes International, 44 (2006), 846–847.
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EAC model,40 could have been kept in reserve, rather 
than included in the model, to be given up in return for 
something else during negotiations.
The COMESA model
The COMESA model tax treaty was developed by 
European consultants in 2010-12.41 The project 
seems to have originated with a desire to conclude 
more treaties among COMESA members, but it has 
subsequently begun to be used by COMESA members 
in negotiations with developed countries as well, 
according to a COMESA official. 
Like the EAC model, the COMESA model has some 
strengths in comparison to the UN model, but its 
protection of source taxing rights is weaker than both 
the EAC and UN models. For example, its PE definition 
omits both delivery units and dependent agents 
maintaining stock; it also follows the less-expansive 
OECD definition of royalties. The model doesn’t 
specify withholding tax rates, which may be preferable 
to the compromise rates specified in the EAC model, 
but is less beneficial than higher rates would be. 
Unlike the EAC and SADC models, it doesn’t include an 
article on technical service fees.
There are two main advantages to the COMESA 
model. The first is the inclusion of main purpose tests 
in some of the withholding tax articles; these are 
specific anti-avoidance provisions that complement 
the treaty’s ‘beneficial owner’ and ‘special relationship’ 
provisions.42
Second, member states can enter reservations on 
the COMESA model. For example, Burundi, Malawi, 
Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia have all 
entered reservations indicating that they prefer to 
tax management fees in the same way as royalties. 
Notably, Mauritius has entered reservations stating 
that it does not wish to include certain anti-avoidance 
provisions in its treaties.
The SADC model
The SADC model was an important point of departure 
for the COMESA model, and the two are similar in 
many respects. Where they differ, the SADC model is 
usually more generous to capital importing countries. 
This includes the inclusion of a technical service fees 
article in the main text, a ‘property rich’ companies 
paragraph in the capital gains article, and a broader 
definition of royalties. Countries can also enter 
reservations on the SADC model, and there are quite a 
large number of reservations. The SADC model is thus 
less generous to capital importers than the UN model, 
but more generous than the COMESA model.
The SADC and COMESA models may have been 
foreseen more as a model for negotiations between 
member states (there is a SADC memorandum of 
understanding that encourages members to conclude 
treaties among themselves). But this does not mean 
that concerns about protection of source taxation 
rights are irrelevant. “There has been a relaxed 
approach to fellow African countries because you 
don’t expect them to be killing you,” one official said. 
“But they are.” These organisations include among 
their memberships larger capital exporters (South 
Africa in SADC, Egypt in COMESA) and two tax havens 
(Mauritius and the Seychelles) as well as some 
countries that may be smaller scale capital exporters, 
such as Kenya.
40 For example: source taxation of shipping in article 8 of the UN model, which is probably uninteresting for a landlocked country; inclusion 
of payments for the use of equipment within the definition of royalties; taxation of senior managers in article 16 of the UN model.
41 Roger Bunting, Peter Fawcett, and Caroline Makasa, A Roadmap for Further Negotiations by COMESA Countries (Brussels, 2012).
42 Notably, Mauritius has entered a reservation on these articles.
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The United Nations
The UN model is formally titled the “Model Double 
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries,” and it is produced by a committee of 
experts with a mandate “to have regard to the special 
needs of developing countries.”43 It was first published 
in 1980, when it closely reflected the OECD model. 
Since then it has been updated twice, most recently 
in 2011, with a growing divergence between the two. 
The Committee intends to produce a further update 
before its current four year term ends in 2016. Some 
significant changes in the forthcoming UN model are 
likely to be a proposed article allowing developing 
countries to tax technical service fees (as is already 
included in the SADC and EAC model treaties), a 
proposed article dealing with tax planning through 
‘hybrid entities’, and improvements to the article on 
information exchange.
Table 8: regional model treaties compared to the UN model
UN model reference Provision EAC COMESA SADC
5(3)(a) Construction PE (months) 6 Unspecified Unspecified
5(3)(a) Supervisory activities Yes Yes Yes
5(3)(b) Service PE (months) 6 Unspecified Unspecified
10 WHT on FDI dividend (%) 7.5 Unspecified Unspecified
10 FDI threshold (%) 50 Unspecified Unspecified
10 WHT on portfolio dividend (%) 15 Unspecified Unspecified
11 WHT on interest (%) 10 OR 15 Unspecified^ Unspecified
12 WHT on royalties (%) 10 OR 15 Unspecified^ Unspecified
12a WHT on management fees 10 No* Unspecified
13(4) Capital gains – ‘property rich’ No No Yes
13(5) Capital gains – other shares No No No
General limitation of benefits Yes No No
26 Exchange of information Yes Yes Yes
27 Collection of taxes Yes Yes Yes
Red indicates provision is worse (less source-based) than the UN model
Green indicates provision is better (more source-based) than the UN model
^ Includes main purpose test
* Among the reservations to the COMESA model, some countries, including Uganda and Zambia, reserve the right 
to include a separate article concerning technical service fees, similar to article 12
4.3 Developments in other international organisations
Summary: Both the UN and OECD are making improvements to their model treaties, some of which have 
been anticipated in one or other of the African models. But limited African participation in the work of the UN 
committee, together with the small number of observations entered by African countries on the OECD model, 
mean that African countries are not getting the most that could be achieved from these forums.
43  An alternative perspective is given in John F Avery Jones, “Are Tax Treaties Necessary?,” Tax Law Review 53, no. 1 (1999): 1–38. “There 
seems little need for a separate model for developing countries. All that is needed is an acceptance by OECD members of the developing 
countries’ need for more source tax.”
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Renegotiating individual treaties to incorporate newer 
provisions of the UN model could be to developing 
countries’ benefit, but should be approached with 
caution. There are two reasons for this. The first is 
that negotiations to date using the UN model have 
not been too successful. Although developing country 
negotiators frequently refer to the UN model as their 
starting point in negotiations, the actual treaties 
signed by developing countries contain on average 
many more OECD provisions than UN provisions.44 
This may be because developing countries’ domestic 
tax laws are weaker than the UN model, because of 
the imbalance in negotiating power or because the 
UN model has not been updated as frequently as the 
OECD model, leading to a view that some provisions 
are out of date.
The second reason is the lack of African influence on 
the updates to the UN model. The UN committee 
suffers from a lack of resources, and it has faced 
some difficult disagreements between members from 
developed and developing countries, a notable current 
example being over the proposed article on technical 
service fees. As a former Zambian member of the UN 
committee said, “in the UN, there are big boys there, 
and that is the fight you have to face.”
There are five UN committee members from Africa 
(Ghana, Zambia, Senegal, South Africa and Morocco), 
and a handful of other observers from Africa,45 but 
nothing like the coordinated approach to influencing 
the UN instruments that can be observed from, in 
particular, the European Union countries. Far more 
developing countries attend the annual OECD Tax 
Treaties Meeting, which is primarily a talking shop, 
than the UN committee session, at which decisions 
are made. Given the number of countries that profess 
to rely on the UN model, this is a dangerous surrender 
of influence to other countries.
The OECD
Although the OECD model treaty is not designed with 
developing countries’ needs in mind, the OECD has 
considerably more technical capacity than the UN, 
some of which is expended on improvements that 
benefit both developed and developing countries. This 
is manifested in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
project, which will produce a number of changes to 
the OECD model tax treaty that will help reduce the 
risk of tax planning. This includes the introduction 
of an anti-treaty shopping provision, as is already 
included in the EAC model treaty.46
The OECD proposes to disseminate these changes 
through a multilateral convention, which would 
implement changes to all the existing bilateral treaties 
between signatories to the convention, subject to 
various opt-outs and opt-ins.47 This may provide an 
opportunity for developing countries to update their 
treaties in ways that strengthen their protection 
against tax planning, but it may also carry the risk 
of substituting less advantageous OECD provisions 
into existing treaties negotiated by developing 
countries. This will depend on the eventual form of the 
multilateral convention.
Many African countries attend the OECD’s annual tax 
treaties meeting, as well as participating in its task 
force on tax and development. But decisions about 
the OECD model tax treaty are taken at meetings of 
Working Party 1, which only South Africa is entitled to 
attend among sub Saharan countries. Non-members 
are, however, able to enter formal “observations” 
on the OECD model treaty and its commentary.  As 
figure 1 below shows, Ivory Coast, Gabon and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo are the only sub-
Saharan states to have entered observations on the 
OECD model.
44 Wim Wijnen and Jan de Goede, “The UN Model in Practice 1997-2013” (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2013).
45 for example Tanzania, which has attended the last few committee sessions and spoke at both
46 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances.
47 OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (OECD Publishing, July 19, 2013), http:/www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/action-
plan-on-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264202719-en.
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Figure 9: Number of observations recorded on the OECD model by non-member countries
Because sub-Saharan countries frequently accept 
OECD model provisions in their treaties, it would be 
important for them to enter observations both to 
improve their negotiating stance and to prepare the 
ground for treaty disputes that might turn to the 
model treaty and its commentary.
For example, in 2010 the OECD made changes to 
article 7 of its model convention that substantially 
shifted the balance of taxing rights away from the 
operating countries of multinationals to their head 
office countries. Objections to this change were 
registered on behalf of Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South 
Africa and Thailand.49 This declared opposition is 
surely useful for developing countries wishing to 
prevent the inclusion of the new OECD provision in a 
treaty, and sub Saharan countries would do well to 
register their objection to clauses such as this.
48 Alberto Vega and Ilja Rudyk, “Explaining Reservations to the OECD Model Tax Convention: An Empirical 
Approach,” Indret, 2011, 
49 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 2010th edn (Paris: OECD, 2010).1–19.
Source: Vega & Rudyck, 201148
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5 Conclusion and recommendations
Policymakers in African countries in 2015 have inherited tax treaty networks that are based on past 
priorities stretching back as far as 60 years. These treaties are not based on their present day needs or 
informed by today’s evidence on their positive and negative effects. This leaves African countries vulnerable 
to unnecessary revenue loss, not only through tax treaty shopping, but also because past governments 
negotiated away taxing rights for which they now get no concessions in return. 
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to fixing these 
problems. Some treaties may resolve real double 
taxation problems, or have clinched borderline 
investments. But we can be sure that all treaties in 
force in African countries, whether they are five or 
50 years old, need an evidence-based review. A clear 
policy needs to guide renegotiations, cancellations and 
any new future treaties. It should take into account:
· Whether there is a real need, based on the two 
countries’ tax systems, to protect investors 
from double taxation 
· The actual or expected effect of a treaty on 
investment flows
· The revenue costs from the treaty, including 
from tax treaty shopping
· Any precedent set for future negotiations
With this in mind, African countries should conduct 
full reviews of their tax treaty networks. These may 
require external expertise, but if that is the case 
it should also raise questions about a country’s 
readiness to negotiate new treaties at all. In the words 
of a COMESA secretariat official “Some countries don’t 
know how important DTAs are. They are just signing 
them without knowing. If a DTA isn’t negotiated fairly 
by the government, it is going to lose revenue.”
African countries should:
1) Review all their existing tax treaties and 
domestic legislation, to identify areas where 
they are most vulnerable to revenue loss. This 
should include PE definitions, protection from 
treaty shopping, and withholding and capital 
gains taxes.
2) Formulate ambitious national models by 
applying a “best available” approach to existing 
models (EAC, COMESA and UN), current treaties, 
and domestic legislation, none of which are 
currently adequate for this purpose. This might 
include:
a) All elements of the UN model PE definition, 
with short period of time for construction 
sites and service PEs, such as the 90 days in 
Ugandan law.
b) 15% withholding tax rates across-the-board, 
including on technical service fees, as per 
Uganda’s treaty with the UK and its domestic 
legislation, with main purpose tests for passive 
income as per the COMESA model.
c) Include all capital gains provisions from the UN 
model, even where there is currently no capital 
gains tax.
d) The Limitation of Benefits clause from the EAC 
model or the forthcoming new OECD provision.
e) Exchange of information and collection of taxes 
provisions from the UN and EAC models.
3) Identify red lines for negotiations. This should 
certainly include items c, d and e from the above 
list.
4) Based on investment and remittance data, 
request renegotiations of treaties that have 
the greatest actual (or potential in terms of 
capital gains) cost. These renegotiations should 
be conducted on the basis of an improved 
distribution of taxing rights, not a “balanced” 
negotiation.
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5) Cancel these high-impact treaties if the red lines 
cannot be obtained.
In some African countries, such as Zambia and 
Uganda, treaties are ratified by the cabinet, with no 
parliamentary scrutiny.  This should be changed, 
so that democratic representatives can scrutinise 
the deal struck by negotiators. There is some 
welcome progress here, including in Uganda, where 
the government has committed to consulting as 
it formulates its new policy on tax treaties, and in 
Kenya, where Tax Justice Network Africa has issued 
a legal challenge to a tax treaty ratified without 
parliamentary scrutiny. Since tax treaties often seem 
to be revenue concessions granted with the idea of 
attracting foreign investment, they should be subject 
to the same scrutiny as should tax incentives. 
African countries should:
6) Incorporate an assessment of tax foregone due 
to tax treaties into an annual breakdown of tax 
expenditures; and
7) Ensure that all tax treaties are subject to 
parliamentary approval as part of the ratification 
process.
Finally, African countries recognise the impact that 
changes to the two main international model treaties 
may have on them. Existing international models, 
including those developed among African countries, 
may not be as ambitious as they could choose to be. 
Following recommendation 2 above, they should:
8) Ensure that future updates to provisions of 
the UN and OECD model treaties, or to their 
commentaries and reservations/observations, 
reflect the positions set out in their national 
models.
9) Strengthen the African model treaties (EAC, 
COMESA, SADC) so that they act as opposite 
poles to the OECD model, rather than 
compromises between the UN and OECD 
models.
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